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ABSTRACT 18 
Technological changes, capital investment, organizational reforms, and external factors can 19 
impact railway productivity. Using non-parametric single-factor and multifactor productivity 20 
(SFP and MFP) Törnqvist trans-log index approaches, we evaluated the performance of high-21 
speed rail (HSR) lines in the U.S. during FY 2002-2012.  22 
Intercity rail transportation in the NEC experienced considerable yet highly volatile 23 
productivity growth during FY 2002-2012, in the range of ~1-3% per year. Amtrak increased its 24 
ability to economically exploit the available capacity, but did not perform equally well on the 25 
supply side. The NEC became cumulatively 20% more productive on the demand side but only 26 
3% on the supply side of productivity with respect to 2005 levels. Service changes, technical 27 
problems with trains, targeted capital investments, and economic recession and recovery were 28 
the main drivers of productivity change.  29 
The main train services, the Acela Express and Northeast Regional, were very sensitive 30 
to external events, had large economies of scale, and implemented slow adjustment of capacity 31 
via rolling stock and infrastructure improvements, which varied depending on the service. 32 
In the face of ongoing planning efforts, the NEC could consider the resurgence of 33 
demand and recent substantial productivity improvements to launch ambitious plans for HSR. 34 
Additional ideas of organization and coordination of rail could reveal hidden opportunities for 35 
future HSR development. 36 
 37 
1. INTRODUCTION 38 
In this paper we evaluate the performance the Northeast Corridor (NEC) from FY 2002-2012 39 
using productivity analysis. Then we discuss current planning processes for HSR development. 40 
 41 
2. OVERVIEW OF AMTRAK AND THE NEC 42 
Amtrak is the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, a publicly owned company operated and 43 
managed as a for-profit, private corporation. It began operations on 1971, after consolidation of 44 
several private passenger railroads, and nowadays operates a 22,000-mile passenger rail 45 
nationwide system.  46 
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The Northeast Corridor (NEC) stretches from Washington, D.C., to Boston, MA. With 47 
over 55 million people and a $2.6 trillion economy equal to one-fifth of the U.S. GDP, it is the 48 
most densely settled region and one of the economic engines of the country. The NEC is a 49 
complex multi-state, multi-operator, multi-use, and multi-owner railway corridor. It runs through 50 
several major metropolitan areas, 12 states and the District of Columbia. It involves eight 51 
commuter operators and one intercity-travel operator (Amtrak). It comprises multi-track 52 
alignments on which both freight and passenger trains run every day.  53 
As shown in Figure 1, the 457-mile NEC-spine alignment is shared between Amtrak (363 54 
route miles), the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) (38 route miles), and the 55 
states of New York and Connecticut (46 route miles). In addition, there are rail branches out of 56 
the NEC spine to Springfield, MA, Albany, NY, and Harrisburg, PA.  57 
 58 
FIGURE 1 NEC Ownership and Operations (NEC MPWG 2010). 59 
 60 
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2.1. NEC Intercity Passenger Rail Services 61 
Amtrak offers multiple services along the NEC, two of which are a focus of this paper; they are 62 
hereon referred to as NEC-spine trains: 63 
The Acela Express, introduced in December 2000, runs from Boston to Washington via 64 
New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. It is the fastest rail service in the U.S., technically high-65 
speed rail (HSR)
1
, capable of achieving top speeds of 150 mph in short sections of the trip. Its 66 
average speed, though, is only on the order of 70-80 mph, which results in a scheduled travel 67 
time of approximately six and a half hours from Boston to Washington (~3½ hours from Boston 68 
to New York and ~2 hours 45 minutes from New York to Washington). The Acela Express 69 
currently offers various amenities such as first class (business class is the lowest option), on-70 
board Wi-Fi access, and food services. 71 
The Northeast Regional runs from Boston/Springfield to Washington and then to other 72 
cities in the State of Virginia (Richmond, Lynchburg, Newport News or Norfolk), via New York, 73 
Philadelphia, and Baltimore. The service had existed in various forms before Amtrak’s inception, 74 
and is formally known as the Northeast Regional since 1995. While the top speed is 125 mph, 75 
the average speed is 60-65 mph. This results in a scheduled travel time of approximately eight 76 
hours from Boston to Washington (~4 hours from Boston to New York and ~3½ hours from New 77 
York to Washington). The Northeast Regional offers coach class and business class.  78 
Additional passenger services that operate partly on the NEC spine, but are neither the 79 
focus of the paper nor considered as NEC-spine trains, include: 80 
 Carolinian / Piedmont (New York—Washington— Raleigh, NC—Charlotte, NC) 81 
 Keystone (New York—Philadelphia— Harrisburg, PA)  82 
 Pennsylvanian (New York—Philadelphia— Harrisburg, PA—Pittsburgh, PA) 83 
 Vermonter (Washington—New York— Springfield, MA—Burlington, VT—St. 84 
Albans, VT) 85 
 NEC Special Trains (for exceptional occasions)  86 
 Silver Service / Palmetto (New York— Savannah, GA— Miami, FL via 87 
Washington) 88 
 Cardinal (New York— Chicago, IL via Washington): long-distance service 89 
 Crescent (New York—New Orleans, LA via Washington): long-distance service 90 
Other trains originate in cities on the NEC spine but do not run on NEC-spine tracks: 91 
 Adirondack (New York—Albany, NY—Montreal, Canada) 92 
 Downeaster (Boston North Station2—Portland, ME—Brunswick, ME) 93 
 Empire (New York—Albany, NY—Toronto, Canada) 94 
 Ethan Allen (New York—Albany, NY—Rutland, VT) 95 
 New Haven, CT—Springfield, MA 96 
 Washington—Lynchburg, VA  97 
 Washington—Newport News, VA 98 
 Capitol Ltd. (Washington—Chicago, IL): long-distance service 99 
 Lake Shore Ltd. (New York/Boston—Albany, NY—Chicago, IL): long-distance  100 
                                                 
1
 The Acela Express could be classified as HSR-Regional according to the FRA (2009), because it reaches top 
speeds of 110-150 mph; however, it would not be deemed HSR by European standards (Council of the European 
Union Directive 96/48) or when comparing with countries with full-fledged HSR lines and similar network 
structure, like France, Japan, Korea or Taiwan. 
2
 Boston’s North Station is not part of the NEC spine but South Station is. 
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2.2. NEC Performance during FY 2002-2012 101 
The NEC is currently the most heavily utilized railway corridor in the U.S. Every weekday, 102 
Amtrak operates 154 intercity trains, commuter agencies run more than 2,000 trains serving 103 
upwards of 750,000 commuters, and 70 daily freight trains from seven different companies run 104 
along shared tracks. The difference in operating speeds as well as infrastructure constraints (e.g., 105 
old bridges, short radii of curvature) – especially on the Boston-New York segment and in the 106 
New York metropolitan area – limit the ability of the rolling stock to maintain high speeds and 107 
contribute to the reduced available capacity of the corridor. 108 
Four notable episodes marked the last decade in the NEC: 109 
1. Removal of the Clocker Service in 2005, and Federal and Metroliner in 2006. The 110 
Clocker ran between Philadelphia and New York, mostly serving commuters and day-111 
travelers until 2005. The Federal replaced a sleeper train on the NEC, and gradually 112 
merged operations with regional trains. The Metroliner ran from January 1969 to October 113 
2006, and was discontinued as the Acela was implemented.  114 
2. Technical problems with Acela trains in 2002 and 2005. Cracks in the power unit yaw 115 
damper brackets forced a temporary halt of the Acela fleet in 2002. Problems with the 116 
braking system in 2005 were severe enough that the entire Acela fleet was shelved from 117 
April to July, and did not resume full service until September. 118 
3. Economic recession of 2008-2009. 119 
4. Allocation of federal funding for capital investments on the NEC, starting in 2009. 120 
 121 
FIGURE 2 a) NEC Ridership and b) Ticket Revenue
3
 during FY 2002-2012
4
  122 
(Adapted from Amtrak 2011a, 2011b, 2009-2012). 123 
  124 
 125 
                                                 
3
 Ticket revenue is in 2012 dollars, corrected for inflation with the transportation Consumer Price Index (CPI) series 
CUUR0000SAT 2002-2007 and CUUR0000SS53022 2007-2012 (USBLS 2013). 
4
 The Clocker, a commuter service, distorts ridership figures and is usually excluded from calculation of NEC 
performance. 
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As shown in Figure 2, in FY 2012, NEC-spine trains carried 11.4 million passengers and 126 
generated $1.05 billion ticket revenue, growing 36% and 45% since FY 2003, respectively. This 127 
represented 52% of Amtrak’s ticket revenue and 36% of Amtrak’s overall riders in FY 2012. 128 
Quite different from the financial performance of Amtrak as a whole, the NEC reported a $289 129 
million operational contribution (excluding depreciation, capital charge and interest)
5
 in FY 130 
2012. After the economic recession of 2009, ridership on NEC-spine trains grew at 500,000 131 
riders per year. By FY 2011, Amtrak’s services captured 77% and 54% of the Washington—132 
New York and New York—Boston competitive air/rail markets (Amtrak 2012).  133 
There were important differences between Express and Regional
6
 services on the NEC. 134 
On one hand, ridership on Express services was flat at 3-3.4 million annual passengers from FY 135 
2002 to 2012, despite downturns in FY 2005, due to technical problems on Acela trains, and in 136 
FY 2009, due to the economic recession. On the other hand, ridership on Regional services went 137 
up almost steadily at about 200,000 riders per year to 8 million annual passengers, with a 138 
temporary surge in FY 2005 that accommodated some of the spillover demand from Express 139 
services, and a dip in FY 2009. Although real ticket revenue has increased by 47% and 36% 140 
since FY 2003 on the Express and Regional services, respectively, the former were more 141 
sensitive to economic conditions than the latter. IT is notable that despite having only half the 142 
ridership of Regional services and a third of the overall NEC ridership, Express services 143 
contributed half the ticket revenue and 72% of the operational contribution of the NEC.  144 
Contrary to the impressive market performance, the level of service offered to travelers 145 
has only marginally improved. Despite various HSR improvements to the NEC, such as 146 
electrification and procurement of HSR trains, substantial travel-time improvements have yet to 147 
be achieved and the NEC still lacks a true international-quality HSR service according to 148 
international benchmarks. Additionally, an infrastructure maintenance backlog of $8 billion has 149 
yet to be addressed.  150 
Average load factor (ALF) of the trains is still low, relative to air, but rapidly improving: 151 
63% on the Acela and 48% on the Northeast Regional in 2012, up from 51% and 42% in 2006, 152 
respectively. On the other hand, available seat-miles (ASM) have only grown modestly, from 3.2 153 
to 3.5 billion during 2006-2012. Then, most of the new NEC riders are accommodated on the 154 
still available surplus capacity, not on new capacity, and improved traffic growth, while 155 
gratifying to Amtrak, burdens an already capacity-constrained corridor.  156 
 157 
3. MEASURING PRODUCTIVITY IN PASSENGER RAIL 158 
TRANSPORTATION  159 
 160 
3.1. Definition 161 
Productivity is, at the most fundamental level, a ratio between outputs and inputs used to 162 
evaluate the performance of an entity such as a country, industry, firm, system or process. It is 163 
popular among economic researchers because it is an objective performance measure, and 164 
because productivity gains can help explain the long-term growth of an entity. 165 
                                                 
5
 Amtrak’s monthly performance reports contained financial performance of routes before capital charges, 
depreciation and interest, which would lower the above-reported figures once taken into account. 
6
 Express services include the Acela Express and the Metroliner. Regional services include the Federal and the 
Northeast Regional. Several format changes of the reports impede more specific route accountability for the selected 
time period. As mentioned in section 2.1., the Federal and Metroliner have been out of service since 2006, therefore, 
from 2006 on, Express refers exclusively to Acela Express, and Regional refers exclusively to Northeast Regional. 
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Productivity can be increased by producing the same outputs with fewer inputs, by 166 
producing more outputs with the same inputs, or by combining the two approaches. Of interest 167 
are the factors behind such a change in productivity, the drivers of productivity, which can be 168 
classified in three main categories: 169 
1. Technological change, e.g., improved equipment, improved maintenance techniques 170 
2. Organizational change, e.g., improved management practices, changing legislation 171 
3. Externalities, e.g., industry/market behavior, external events, consumer preferences 172 
So, with objective productivity metrics and identification of the drivers of productivity, 173 
decision-makers can understand how their entity behaves and take courses of action to attain 174 
more efficient processes and achieve long-term growth. However, productivity does not imply 175 
profitability, because financial performance depends on such additional factors as fares, 176 
competition, and liabilities. Rather, good productivity implies an improved process, and it is not 177 
a sufficient condition for profitability.  178 
 179 
3.2. Productivity Metrics 180 
Four classes of productivity metrics are commonly found but sometimes imprecisely used in 181 
productivity studies. They are identified by the number of outputs and inputs they relate. This 182 
research clarifies and uses them as follows: 183 
1. Single-Factor Productivity (SFP), for a single-output single-input process, is the ratio of 184 
the output to the input.  185 
2. Multi-Factor Productivity (MFP), in a single-output multi-input process, relates the single 186 
output to a function that aggregates the multiple inputs. 187 
3. Total Factor Productivity (TFP), in a multi-output multi-input process, relates a function 188 
that aggregates the multiple outputs to another function that aggregates the multiple 189 
inputs. 190 
4. Partial Productivity is an arbitrary ratio of an output to an input used in processes with 191 
multiple outputs and/or inputs. This measure is not recommended by the author, though 192 
commonly used in the literature. 193 
Two common mistakes among researchers are to use MFP and TFP interchangeably and 194 
to label Partial Productivity as SFP.  195 
 196 
3.3. Available Methods 197 
Productivity metrics (SFP, MFP or TFP) require data processing techniques that depend on the 198 
question of interest, the type of data, the data availability, the computational resources, and other 199 
context-specific constraints.  200 
A myriad of methods for calculating productivity are available and the main differences 201 
involve working with physical or monetary input and output data; using incremental productivity 202 
gains or absolute values of productivity; calculating year-to-year and/or cumulative productivity 203 
gains; and using parametric (estimation of production or cost functions through regression 204 
analyses) or non-parametric methods (no need for statistical estimation) to aggregate multiple 205 
outputs or inputs. The interested reader can find a more thorough explanation of the terms in 206 
Archila 2013. 207 
 208 
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3.4. Productivity Studies of Rail Transportation 209 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, there have been no previously published productivity 210 
studies of Amtrak or the NEC, but studies have been published for freight railroads or for 211 
international locations.  212 
In the most relevant study of passenger rail transportation, Caves et al. (1980) determined 213 
that TFP of U.S. railroads, for passenger and freight rail, measured with parametric and non-214 
parametric methods, increased 1.5% per year on average in 1951-1974. Then, Caves et al. (1981) 215 
concluded that the less regulated Canadian railroads achieved higher TFP gains than the more 216 
regulated U.S. railroads, measured with a parametric method, in 1955-1974. Tretheway et al. 217 
(1997) used partial productivity measures (labeled as SFP) and parametric and non-parametric 218 
TFP to analyze the effect of ownership, deregulation, and technological changes in two Canadian 219 
railways, CN and CP, in 1956-1991. Cantos el al. (1999) concluded that reforms that provided 220 
greater degrees of autonomy and financial independence contributed greatly to increases in 221 
productivity of European railways in 1970-1995, measured via a non-parametric TFP index. 222 
Finally, Cowie (2002) found via a non-parametric MFP index that ownership structure and not 223 
ownership per se was relevant as a determinant of productivity gains in British Rail. 224 
Hence, these studies generally employ many and differing outputs, inputs, metrics, and 225 
methods. Sometimes “partial productivity” measures are used, freight and passenger 226 
transportation are combined, or results are inconclusive due to unreliable data. The focus of 227 
previous studies is economic and operational – mainly at the industry or carrier level, rarely at 228 
the corridor level – and there is little attention to the level of service or the quality of inputs and 229 
outputs. 230 
Even though there is no consensus on outputs, inputs, metrics, and methods for passenger 231 
rail transportation productivity analysis, some commonly used outputs are revenue, available 232 
seat-miles (ASM) – as a proxy for transportation capacity – and revenue passenger-miles (RPM) 233 
– as a proxy for transportation volume. Some commonly used inputs are labor, capital – terms 234 
used in mainstream economic literature – and energy – which is specific to transportation. 235 
 236 
4. PRODUCTIVITY ANALYSIS DURING FY 2002-2012 237 
 238 
4.1. Data 239 
Output and input data were directly retrieved or indirectly derived from Amtrak’s year-end 240 
monthly performance reports from FY 2003 to 2012
7
. Section C, Route Performance, of 241 
Amtrak’s reports included operational data at the individual route level. Section A, Financial 242 
Results, of Amtrak reports included data on ridership and revenue.  243 
Amtrak changed the format of the monthly performance reports four times during the 244 
period of study: in FY 2005, 2006, 2009, and 2010. These format changes comprised different, 245 
sometimes incompatible cost breakdowns, allocation methods, or route definitions. Fortunately, 246 
each report included consistently-reported data from the current and previous fiscal year. This 247 
enabled valid year-to-year comparisons and calculations, which are the core of the method of 248 
analysis (see Section 4.2). In years with a format change, this also allowed to check that data 249 
categories under different formats were comparable. In the face of conflicted data for a given 250 
fiscal year, after consideration of format changes, priority was given to audited over preliminary 251 
reports and to newer over older reports. 252 
                                                 
7
 Unfortunately, reports prior to FY 2003 were not available to researchers, which could have used to estimate 
productivity metrics in years before the introduction of the Acela Express. 
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Amtrak’s accounting systems have been imprecise because they rely heavily on cost 253 
allocation (i.e., the use of statistical estimation or other allocation methods) rather than cost 254 
assignment (i.e., the actual tracking of costs to a particular route or service), and have had trouble 255 
consolidating data from different sources. Congress mandated Amtrak to implement the FRA 256 
methodology for cost allocation in 2005 and design a modern accounting and reporting system in 257 
2010, which has shown some improvement over previous systems. However, Amtrak is still 258 
unable to report costs more precisely because it “does not collect sufficiently detailed cost data” 259 
and assigns only about 20% of them (FRA, 2013).  260 
After accounting for the several format changes in Amtrak’s reporting categories, the 261 
available outputs were ridership, (ticket) revenue, RPM, and ASM, and the available input was 262 
operating costs. Monetary quantities were inflated by the corresponding CPI to 2012 dollars. 263 
Auxiliary metrics such as RPM and ASM were derived from reported data, where possible. 264 
 Since some routes entered or exited service, and data were sometimes reported for 265 
combined routes, the analyzed sets of routes were NEC level, Express (Acela + Metroliner), and 266 
Regional (Northeast Regional + Federal). 267 
 268 
4.2. Method of Analysis 269 
Given that there is only a single input but four outputs with different meanings, four 270 
distinct SFP metrics were used to strengthen the analysis. On the supply side, ASM SFP with 271 
respect to operating costs is a proxy for the effectiveness at generating transportation capacity; 272 
on the demand side, ridership, revenue, and RPM SFP with respect to operating costs are 273 
measures of the effectiveness at exploiting the available capacity. Revenue SFP with respect to 274 
operating costs, in particular, reflects how effective Amtrak was at economically exploiting the 275 
available capacity
8
. 276 
Each year-to-year SFP metric was calculated via a non-parametric Törnqvist trans-log 277 
index as follows, and then compounded to obtain the cumulative SFP, with 2005 as the base year 278 
for all calculations: 279 
  280 
Where y=output x=input, 1= current year, and 0=previous year  281 
 282 
Finally, a sensitivity analysis with respect to the route definitions and the inflation 283 
parameters showed that results were robust to changes in key assumptions (see Archila 2013). 284 
 285 
4.2. SFP Analysis of the NEC during FY 2002-2012 286 
As shown in Table 1 and Figure 3, the NEC experienced considerable yet highly volatile SFP 287 
growth during FY 2002-2012 (in the range of ~1-3% per year), which was boosted by the 288 
notable SFP improvements of the past three years.  289 
Since 2005, the yearly average growth in ridership, revenue, RPM, and ASM SFP at the 290 
NEC level was 0.9%, 2.8%, 2.5%, and 0.4% respectively. However, in recent times, yearly 291 
increments have reached as high as 20% for some SFP metrics, while unfavorable shocks in FY 292 
2006 and 2009 resulted in yearly dips as low as -19%. Such dips interrupted what might 293 
otherwise have been an ever-increasing trend in SFP.  294 
                                                 
8
 For simplicity, the words “operating costs” are removed from the productivity label, as it is the sole input of each 
SFP metric. 
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After some oscillations, the NEC SFP net growth from FY 2005-2010 was negative, 295 
which contrasted with previous, though modest, improvements in ridership and revenue SFP. 296 
However, by 2012, the NEC became cumulatively 20% more productive on the demand side (as 297 
measured by revenue SFP and RPM SFP) though just 3% more productive on the supply side 298 
(ASM SFP) with respect to the 2005 levels. 299 
 300 
TABLE 1 NEC, Express, and Regional Year-To-Year SFP Growth, FY 2002-2012  301 
(Archila 2013) 302 
FY Ridership Revenue RPM ASM Ridership Revenue RPM ASM Ridership Revenue RPM ASM
2011-2012 10% 11% 8% 5% 9% 11% 8% 9% 9% 11% 8% 2%
2010-2011 15% 20% 16% 15% 13% 20% 14% 9% 17% 19% 17% 18%
2009-2010 3% 0% 5% -2% 12% 7% 13% 3% -2% -5% 0% -5%
2008-2009 -11% -13% -8% 3% -12% -13% -10% 1% -11% -14% -8% 4%
2007-2008 11% 10% 17% 7% 3% 7% 6% 1% 16% 13% 24% 11%
2006-2007 2% 7% 4% -3% 5% 6% 7% -7% 2% 6% 2% -1%
2005-2006 -18% -10% -19% -19% -17% -13% -15% -20% -18% -10% -20% -17%
2004-2005 9% 2% --- --- 5% -2% --- --- 12% 9% --- ---
2003-2004 9% 3% --- --- 6% 2% --- --- 10% 4% --- ---
2002-2003 1% -4% --- --- 0% -3% --- --- 1% -4% --- ---
Yearly Average Growth
2005-2012 0.9% 2.8% 2.5% 0.4% 1.3% 2.9% 2.8% -1.1% 1.0% 2.1% 2.4% 1.3%
2002-2012 2.4% 2.0% --- --- 2.0% 1.7% --- --- 3.0% 2.4% --- ---
Express SFP Regional SFPNEC SFP
 303 
 304 
FIGURE 3 NEC Cumulative SFP Growth FY 2002-2012  305 
(Archila 2013). 306 
 307 
The major episodes listed earlier provided some causes for this varying productivity 308 
(service changes, technical problems with trains, targeted capital investments, and economic 309 
recession and recovery). Notably, the economic downturn of 2008-2009 made less of an impact 310 
on the NEC productivity than the problems associated with the stoppage of the Acela Express in 311 
some months of 2005. While the economic recession was mostly troublesome on the demand 312 
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side, the train stoppage affected the supply side, hence increasing costs and underserving 313 
demand. As evidence, the NEC ASM SFP dropped -19% in FY 2005-2006, but increased 3% 314 
during the economic recession, whereas the RPM SFP decreased -19% and -8% in the two 315 
situations. Counterintuitively, the reestablishment of the Acela Express in FY 2006 largely 316 
reduced all SFP metrics, because Acela rolling stock greatly increased the operating costs of 317 
transportation services. 318 
 319 
4.2.1. SFP Metrics Comparisons 320 
In FY 2002-2012, Amtrak increased its ability to economically exploit the available capacity (by 321 
filling up trains with more passengers over longer distances), but did not perform equally well on 322 
the supply side (running trains more effectively). As evidence, cumulative RPM SFP diverged 323 
from and grew more than cumulative ASM SFP since FY 2006. Also, cumulative RPM SFP 324 
exceeded ridership SFP, suggesting that people were traveling longer distances on the existing 325 
NEC services. 326 
Notably, since 2009, the resurgence of transportation demand combined with low 327 
marginal costs per RPM yielded economies of scale that boosted productivity on the demand 328 
side. Most of the new ridership was accommodated on existing capacity, at low marginal costs.  329 
These economies of scale had little effect on the supply side, though. ASM productivity 330 
improved only after appropriations of government funding to address critical infrastructure 331 
bottlenecks on the NEC. This allowed the NEC to become just as ASM productive in FY 2012 as 332 
it was in FY 2005. The difference now is that the increased costs of running HSR rolling stock 333 
are balanced by a more efficient use of infrastructure. A complementary explanation for the 334 
recently-enhanced ASM productivity could be management improvements achieved through 335 
Amtrak’s recent business reorganization, increased focus on the NEC, and other management 336 
changes. 337 
Finally, the usage of the capacity was more volatile with respect to external factors than 338 
the generation of capacity. For instance, the economic dip of 2009 greatly affected the demand 339 
side of the NEC (RPM, ridership and revenue SFP) but had little influence on the productivity of 340 
the supply side (ASM SFP). Ridership, revenue, and RPM SFP also increased at higher rates 341 
than ASM SFP in favorable years. Thus, demand-side productivity was more volatile with 342 
respect to external factors than supply-side productivity, which depended more on managerial 343 
and operational practices and events. 344 
 345 
4.2.2. Route Comparisons 346 
The Acela Express and Northeast Regional were both very sensitive to external events, had large 347 
economies of scale, and implemented slow adjustment of capacity via rolling stock and 348 
infrastructure improvements, but their performance was not uniform.  349 
There are two important distinctions in the evolution of SFP for Express and Regional 350 
services. First, after FY 2006, the ASM productivity of express services kept going down while 351 
the ASM productivity of regional services recovered more rapidly. The introduction of more 352 
Acela services (newer rolling stock) and the removal of older trains (Metroliner) increased 353 
operating cost per train-mile. Such costs remained high for the express routes, i.e., low ASM 354 
productivity, until the recent capital investments in the NEC. Second, the productivity of express 355 
services was more volatile than that of regional services, displaying a greater range of 356 
performance. Therefore, Express services were more sensitive than Regional services to 357 
changing conditions.  358 
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 359 
FIGURE 4 a) Express and b) Regional Cumulative SFP Growth FY 2002-2012  360 
(Archila 2013). 361 
 362 
 363 
5. FUTURE OF HSR IN THE NEC 364 
Plans for international-quality HSR in the NEC are afoot.  365 
The FRA launched the most relevant initiative for rail development in the NEC: the NEC 366 
FUTURE – Passenger Rail Corridor Investment Plan.  The overarching goal of this planning 367 
effort is to develop a rail network as part of an integrated, multi-modal transportation solution in 368 
the NEC through 2040. The NEC FUTURE will determine, assess and prioritize future 369 
investments on the NEC, and the ongoing planning process is expected to be completed by 2015. 370 
The NEC FUTURE Preliminary Alternatives Report presented fifteen possible 371 
alternatives in April 2012. The alternatives focus on different levels of investment, alignments, 372 
and services, but exclude major institutional changes. While some alternatives do consider top 373 
speeds of 220 mph, others limit top speeds to 160 mph, and the do-nothing alternative is also 374 
being considered. At this early stage of planning, however, the alternatives do not provide 375 
sufficiently detailed information that would have enabled an analysis of projected productivity or 376 
ridership estimates. 377 
In addition, Amtrak has developed plans to introduce international-quality HSR in the 378 
NEC. The productivity of a projected HSR implementation in the NEC from 2015-2040, the 379 
Amtrak Vision for the NEC, was calculated in Archila (2013). This prediction of productivity is 380 
made from publicly available data from Amtrak. Space constraints preclude inclusion of this 381 
analysis, but the interested reader is directed to Archila (2013). 382 
The current planning processes offer the opportunity to seriously consider additional 383 
ideas for the future HSR development in the NEC. First, air/rail interactions are unclear in all 384 
prospects. Even though Amtrak does open the possibility for air/HSR intermodal connections in 385 
its vision, it does not provide details on how these could be developed. Also, the NEC FUTURE, 386 
led by the FRA, could involve the FAA in the planning process and consider air/rail cooperation 387 
explicitly. 388 
In addition, a benchmark of international experiences of introduction of new HSR in four 389 
international corridors similar to the NEC may suggest what could actually happen in the first 390 
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years of operation of an international-quality HSR system in the NEC (Table 2)
9
. In all four 391 
cases, the entrance of HSR significantly affected air traffic and other transportation modes. In 392 
three out of four cases, HSR presented considerable ridership increments above the forecasts 393 
made before the services were in place. In fact, HSR services usually enjoy spectacular growth in 394 
the initial years, which later declines as the market matures (Campos and de Rus 2009). For 395 
example, RPM increased sevenfold in the first decade of HSR operations in Japan (Sakamoto 396 
2012), and ridership doubled in a decade in France (Vickerman 1997). However, in the case of 397 
Taiwan, HSR ridership was less than half of the forecast, attributed to poor intermodal 398 
connections, international economic conditions, and marketing (Cheng 2010). Currently, Amtrak 399 
forecasts 30% more ridership on the NEC after implementation of a HSR segment between New 400 
York and Washington in 2030 (with respect to 2025), and 66% more ridership once the full 401 
Washington-Boston alignment is operating in 2040 (with respect to 2030). Remarkably, ridership 402 
on NEC-Spine trains grew 36% from FY 2003-2012 with just a few capacity upgrades 403 
 404 
Table 2 International Comparisons of HSR Lines (Adapted from Sakamoto 2012, 405 
Thompson and Tanaka 2011 Cheng 2010, and Vickerman 1997) 406 
HSR Line Constructi
on (yrs.) 
Start 
Ops. 
Length 
(mi) 
Actual Impacts on Traffic Actual v. Forecast 
Japan 
(Tokyo-
Osaka) 
5 1964 320 Traffic was diverted 23% 
from air, 16% from cars and 
buses and 6% induced 
demand (Cheng 2010) 
Demand was higher than 
forecasted. In the first decade, 
RPM increased sevenfold, but 
then flattened (Sakamoto 
2012). 
France 
(Lyon-Paris) 
7 1981 260 Most of the diverted 
passengers shifted from air. 
49% induced demand 
(Cheng 2010, Vickerman 
1997). 
Demand was higher than 
forecasted. Total rail 
passengers in the corridor 
doubled in a decade 
(Vickerman 1997). 
South Korea 
(Seoul-Pusan) 
12 2004 206 Air traffic dropped 20%-
30%. Traffic on short 
distances (<100 km) 
increased ~20% (Cheng 
2010). 
Demand was higher than 
forecasted (Thompson and 
Tanaka 2011). 
Taiwan 
(Taipei-
Kaohsiung) 
9 2007 215 Air transportation almost 
exited the market. Passengers 
were diverted from 
conventional rail and buses. 
8% induced demand, but still 
low ridership (Cheng 2010). 
Demand was 50% of forecast 
(Cheng 2010). 
US 
(WAS-NYC) 
(Projected) 
15  2030 225 N/A Additional 6 million annual 
riders (+30%). 
 407 
The international comparisons illustrate three points. First, Amtrak’s projections are 408 
realistic, in the sense that they are within the range of what the international benchmark of actual 409 
performance suggests (and within what Amtrak has achieved in the past decade). Second, 410 
Amtrak’s projections may be a bit low. The actual HSR ridership was higher than forecasted in 411 
                                                 
9
 These international corridors, which have now been expanded, are compared with Amtrak’s projected introduction 
of the HSR in the Washington-New York segment by 2030 –which is the first segment planned to operate from 
2030-2040, until the New York-Boston HSR alignment is finally completed in 2040. 
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three out of four international cases and, in the case where it did poorly, it was largely due to 412 
poor planning and management. The ridership in the NEC might be higher than projections. 413 
Third, HSR construction times were faster than those proposed in the NEC VISION. This could 414 
possibly motivate Amtrak to revise current estimates of ridership and revenue, perhaps even to 415 
accelerate or modify the strategy, and to consider a careful implementation of HSR infrastructure 416 
and service in order to secure ridership, based upon international experiences. 417 
 418 
6. CONCLUSIONS 419 
The last decade in the NEC was marked by route changes, recurrent technical problems with 420 
Acela train sets, economic recession, regional congestion, increased transportation demand, and 421 
federal funding for capital investments. In this period, Amtrak’s NEC services gained significant 422 
air/rail market share and operational surplus, but maintenance backlogs and infrastructure 423 
constraints are still to be addressed.  424 
In terms of productivity, the NEC experienced highly volatile but considerable SFP 425 
growth in FY 2002-2012 (in the range of ~1-3% per year), which was boosted by the notable 426 
improvements of the past three years. Acela Express and Regional services were very sensitive 427 
to external events, had large economies of scale, and implemented slow adjustment of capacity, 428 
but its performance was not uniform. Express services were more sensitive than Regional 429 
services. In parallel, Amtrak increased the ability to fill up and economically exploit the 430 
available capacity, but did not perform equally well on the supply side.  431 
In the face of ongoing planning efforts, the NEC could consider the resurgence of 432 
demand and recent substantial productivity improvements to launch ambitious plans for HSR. 433 
Additional ideas of organization and coordination of rail could reveal hidden opportunities for 434 
future HSR development. 435 
 436 
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